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A Chilling Effect? Are International Investment Agreements 
hindering government’s regulatory autonomy in the areas of 




The plain packaging of tobacco products, the disposal of hazardous waste and the management 
of toxic chemicals are all areas of health, safety and environmental (HSE) regulations which 
have faced legal challenges by private corporations under international investment agreements 
(IIAs) originally established as a means of promoting and protecting inward investment.  These 
legal challenges are made possible by the existence of unique investor state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) provisions, which it is feared are having a chilling impact on the regulatory autonomy 
of governments.  The underlying assumption is that if the regulatory chill hypothesis was to 
hold we would expect, among other things, to find a level of awareness and understanding 
among HSE regulators about the existence and content of these agreements.  The results of this 
research in the Canadian context indicates that regulators are generally not aware of the 
existence of IIAs or of the potential threat of an ISDS challenge and rarely take them into 







The last three decades have seen an increasing trend towards the integration of markets.  The 
establishment of global production chains, the explosion of trade and investment flows as well 
as the development of the international institutional framework to support these trends, have 
resulted in what is commonly referred to as globalization.  As globalization has taken hold, 
concern regarding its impact on the welfare of nations and the policy autonomy of governments 
has increased.  This concern reached public consciousness during the popular uprisings and 
civil society demonstrations in opposition to the proposed Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) within the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in 1998 and against the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its 1999 
ministerial meeting in Seattle, aimed at launching the new Millennium Round of trade 
negotiations.  Currently these issues are being debated in the context of regional trade and 
investment negotiations and have resulted in the removal of investor-state provisions in the 
newly agreed but diminished Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and been a source of contention 
in the CETA ratifications as well as in the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).   The questions these demonstrations and debates have raised, and which 
continue to challenge scholars are whether globalization is having a negative impact on the 
ability of governments to set domestic policy and whether private actors are playing an ever 
increasing role in this equation.   
 
The literature on the impact of the integration of markets is nothing new and has its origins in 
historical work as far back as Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, in which he considered the 
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links between the imposition of taxes and capital flight.1 More contemporary literature has 
looked at whether globalization or market integration has led to either a convergence or 
divergence of government policy making across nations.  Those arguing convergence have 
claimed that market integration has eroded national autonomy, reduced social welfare 
alternatives to the market, created interdependence among governments in policy making or led 
generally to the strengthening of markets and private actors at the expense of governments.2  
They claim that convergence is the result of a regulatory race-to-the-bottom as the exit threats 
of multinational enterprises (MNEs) lead countries to lower standards as they compete for 
capital.  While anecdotal examples abound, there is limited empirical evidence to support these 
claims.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, those globalization proponents arguing divergence 
reject this view and through their empirical work demonstrate that globalization has not 
prevented different approaches to national policies, hindered national policy autonomy or 
resulted in a decline in social welfare policies, at least in the case of developed countries.3  Even 
the biggest proponents of globalization however, suggest that the impact on developing nations 
is likely more problematic. 
 
Within this debate, this paper explores globalization and its impact with respect to international 
investment. International investment represents one important aspect of the overall trend 
towards globalization, with a growing body of bilateral and regional rules in the form of 
international investment agreements (IIAs) 4, providing the institutional framework to support 
it.  There have been many claims that IIAs impose constraints on signatory governments, as 
they provide for a unique mechanism by which national policy decisions can be challenged by 
private actors.  Over the last two decades government regulatory measures in the areas of health, 
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safety and the environment (HSE) have been the subject of challenges by private corporations 
under IIAs signed by countries worldwide, but particularly under NAFTA Chapter 11 on 
investment.5   
 
Just as scholars have linked the exit threats of MNEs to the weakening of regulation6, there is a 
belief that IIAs can cause regulatory chill7, as governments respond to the threat of litigation 
and curtail or amend their regulatory initiatives in an effort to avoid expensive international 
arbitration cases brought by disgruntled corporate investors.  A recent challenge under NAFTA 
Chapter 11 by large US chemical company Dow AgroScience to a Canadian provincial 
pesticide regulation aimed at banning a purported toxic substance 2,4-D, provides an example 
of the types of challenges governments are facing.  Although the Dow AgroScience case 
resulted in a settlement which upheld the pesticide ban with no compensation for the investor, 
many would argue that the very fact that such a case is made possible by the international trade 
and investment system will have an impact on the regulatory development process.  Additional 
high profile challenges to regulatory measures include a case launched against Canada, again 
under NAFTA, by Lone Pine Resources Inc. seeking $250USD million in compensation 
following the province of Quebec’s moratorium on hydraulic fracking and the recently 
unsuccessful challenge to the Australian Government’s plain packaging regulations by Philip 
Morris International under the Hong Kong-Australia bilateral investment treaty.  
 
These challenges to government measures in fundamental areas of public policy are perceived 
as a threat to regulatory autonomy.  The potential for regulatory chill resulting from these cases 
is seen as evidence of weakened national policy autonomy in the context of the debate on 
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globalization.  Moreover, the belief is that these regulatory challenges or threats of challenges, 
are likely to prove more difficult for developing or emerging market countries which are under 
more pressure to attract and retain international investment and whose ability to deal with the 
expense of investor state litigation is limited.8  The Australian tobacco plain packaging 
challenge by Philip Morris it is argued had resulted in many countries worldwide, both 
developed and developing, adopting a wait-and-see approach to their own tobacco control 
regulations.9  This research does not find any convincing or consistent empirical support for the 
argument that IIAs cause regulatory chill. 
 
The modern day investment agreement and concerns over regulatory chill 
 
It is the emergence of the modern day investment agreement and its unique enforcement 
mechanism which has raised this set of issues for signatory governments.  While there are 
conflicting views regarding the effectiveness of these agreements in achieving their stated 
goals, there are equally, as outlined earlier, concerns about their impact. 
 
While the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was signed in 1959, the number of BITs signed 
in the 1980s and 1990s greatly increased, exploding by the early 2000s (Vandevelde, 2005).  
While 309 had been concluded by 1988, the total number of BITs rose to 3,304 by the end of 
2015 (UNCTAD, 2016). In addition, countries began to pursue bilateral and regional 
preferential trade agreements which incorporated BIT style investment components, including 
most notably the NAFTA (Vandevelde, 2005).  Vendevelde points out that in the ten years 
following NAFTA, 39% of all preferential trade agreements would contain investment 
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provisions.10  358 International agreements with investment provisions were concluded by the 
end of 2015 with the balance shifting from bilateral to regional treaty making with respect to 
investment. (UNCTAD, 2016) 
 
IIAs were traditionally signed between developed country governments eager to protect the 
interests of their companies investing abroad and developing country governments seeking to 
attract investment.  Historically, IIAs have been broadly aimed at investment protection, 
promotion and liberalization11 achieved by ensuring non-discriminatory treatment for foreign 
investors, ensuring appropriate levels of protection and operating flexibility as well as a means 
of enforcing such commitments.  These objectives are achieved through a series of provisions 
which are standard in most agreements.  Generally speaking an investment agreement will 
include provisions dealing with the treatment of investors which is non-discriminatory and 
provides a minimum standard, the protection of the investor aimed at ensuring due process and 
compensation for legitimate expropriation and operational flexibility through provisions on the 
free transfer of funds.  Finally, most IIAs will provide protection through recourse to the 
international arbitration provisions of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).   
 
The 1994 negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) Chapter 11 on 
investment represented the first time that such a sophisticated investment protection agreement 
had been negotiated between developed countries.  NAFTA’s Chapter 11 also served to 
highlight the concerns of civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) regarding 
the rights granted under the agreement, which were seen as giving foreign investors rights that 
unduly constrained national policy autonomy, especially in the areas of health, safety and 
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environmental regulation.  More specifically, the private access to international arbitration 
provided for in Chapter 11 resulted in unprecedented challenges to Mexican, Canadian and US 
regulatory measures in these sensitive areas by private investors, addressing what they 
perceived as regulatory takings.12   
 
While legal scholars, civil society groups and the public press continue to raise concerns about 
the potential chilling impact of IIAs and ISDS provisions, particularly under NAFTA Chapter 
11, the majority of scholars have looked at the merits of IIA investment disputes and found 
limited evidence of potential for regulatory chill beyond a handful of anecdotal examples in 
both developed and developing countries.  As Neumayer argues there has been little concrete 
evidence to support the claim for regulatory chill either with respect to internationally mobile 
capital or ISDS challenges under IIAs, however he allows that when anecdotal evidence is 
considered, the potential for chill exists and moreover the threat of an ISDS challenge, as 
Tienhaara has arguably demonstrated13 (Tienhaara, 2009), might have a greater impact than the 
actual cases reviewed.  Furthermore, Neumayer argues that any actual impact from cases to 
date might take time to manifest, suggesting that trends in HSE regulations are likely to reflect 
any possible chilling impact only months or even years after they reach public consciousness 
(Neumayer, 2001:78-90).   
 
Beyond a case by case consideration of this question, a more comprehensive approach for 
consideration of this issue, based around the awareness and understanding of regulators seems 
necessary and represents a gap in research to date.  Coe and Rubins address this issue while 
questioning the rationale of what they term the regulatory chill thesis.    
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‘The regulatory chill thesis is, of course, difficult to prove or disprove. First, it assumes 
that regulators are aware of international law, but are they?  On the one hand, it is likely 
that legislators often attempt to acquaint themselves with the international ramifications 
of contemplated measures likely to affect foreign enterprises.  Indeed, with the 
unprecedented public awareness of investor–state arbitration and the recent burgeoning 
of the associated docket, regulators may be more conscious of the prospect of liability 
than ever before.  Nevertheless, there is still no shortage of State action clearly 
uninformed by the dictates of international law’ (Coe & Rubins 2005:597-667). 
 
This paper sought to probe and address concerns regarding the potential chilling impact of IIAs.  
It aimed to do so by addressing the gaps in empirical work done to date.  To date the empirical 
work has focussed on ISDS challenges and the outcomes of individual cases as well as looking 
at anecdotal evidence of potential chill on the back of ‘threats’ of investment arbitration.14  This 
paper focused on the issue of regulatory chill by looking at the role of ISDS disputes on the 
regulatory development process as well as the general awareness held by regulators of IIAs and 
ISDS.  The assumption of this paper was that if the regulatory chill hypothesis was to hold or 
to be considered a viable possible outcome of IIA legal challenges, we would expect to find a 
number of observable outcomes in regulator behaviour and awareness.   First, and most 
importantly, we would expect to find a level of awareness and understanding among HSE 
regulators about the existence and content of IIAs.  Second, any causal link between IIAs and 
regulatory chill would also need to demonstrate that beyond awareness, that IIAs have an 




The rationale for these expectations rests in the fact that regulatory chill presupposes behaviour 
on the part of regulators, namely that they will curtail regulations or be more reticent to pursue 
more stringent regulations due to the threat of litigation.  It is only by analysing the extent to 
which this has happened consistently and the degree to which regulator actions are deliberate 
and reflect full knowledge of IIAs and their impact, that we can build a comprehensive picture 
of any possible regulatory chill phenomenon.   
 
Methodology and findings 
In order to test the expectations of the hypothesis on regulatory chill, this paper used 
quantitative and qualitative tools through an in-depth case study of Canada’s HSE regulation 
during a period of active ISDS challenges under NAFTA Chapter 11 on investment.  The 
rationale for selecting the Canadian regulatory environment was twofold.  First Canada is a 
developed country with a comprehensive approach to both international trade policy and HSE 
regulation.  In the area of trade and investment, Canada is a member of the WTO and the 
NAFTA and is signatory to numerous high level bilateral trade and investment treaties.  At the 
same time Canada is at the forefront of HSE regulation both in terms of its domestic agenda as 
well as international leadership.   
 
Second and most importantly, Canada has had unique experience at the interface between the 
international trade and investment and the HSE regulatory world through the many NAFTA 
Chapter 11 challenges it has faced to regulation since the agreement entered into force in 1995.  
Canada has faced 28 of the 66 cases brought under NAFTA Chapter 11 over the course of the 
last 20 years, with the largest number of HSE challenges of any other country15.  The nature of 
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these challenges and the timeframe during which they have taken place provides a compelling 
environment for testing the hypothesis for regulatory chill.  If there is any environment in which 
one would expect regulators to be aware of IIAs and the ISDS disputes they entail, it is within 
the Canadian context. Table 1 outlines those HSE NAFTA Chapter 11 investment disputes both 
completed and on-going.  
 
Table 1 – Completed HSE ISDS challenges under NAFTA Chapter 11 
___________________________________ 
Table 1 about here 
___________________________________ 
 
The key question is whether the trade and investment challenges outlined above are impacting 
the development of HSE regulations in Canada regardless of whether they have been resolved 
or remain ongoing.  Has the commencement of a NAFTA dispute in the areas of HSE or the 
eventual outcome of the dispute had an impact on either the trends in regulation in this area or 
on the regulators themselves?  
 
This case study analysis involved in-depth interviews and a survey of senior federal Canadian 
regulators.  During June, September and October 2012, a series of in-depth semi-structured 
interviews were held with 50 officials at the Section Head, Director and Director General levels, 
across the key Canadian federal government HSE departments and agencies.16  Between 
January and March 2013 a survey of senior regulators was conducted across the same 
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departments in an effort to widen the number of responses and allow for some statistical 
analysis. 
 
The main objectives of the interviews and survey was to understand how HSE regulations had 
changed over the last two decades and whether regulators believed they have become more or 
less comprehensive and stringent; to understand the key factors which influence or drive 
regulatory decision making; to ascertain the extent to which Canada’s trade commitments play 
a role in influencing regulatory decision making; to determine which trade commitments have 
the most impact or create the most concern (WTO, IIAs, FTAs); to understand the extent of 
regulator awareness of IIAs, particularly NAFTA Chapter 11 and its possible implications for 
regulation, and whether this awareness is borne from experience with a NAFTA Chapter 11 
ISDS dispute. 
 
In total 395 regulators were contacted for the survey.  140 or 35% of regulators responded and 
114 or 29% of regulators provided complete responses.17  As it is possible in this case to define 
the entire population of interest, this survey was directed at all members of this population and 
not done on the basis of sampling, although a number of assumptions were made in defining 
the population. A HSE regulatory body was defined as a body whose regulatory responsibilities 
govern the development, licensing, monitoring and evaluation stages of a regulation in the 
sphere of HSE.  HSE regulators and policy makers were defined as those government officials 
with a clear policy or regulatory responsibility as well as those with decision making power.  
The electronic survey was undertaken using the Qualtics survey software, then analysed using 
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a statistical software package.  Qualitative coding and analysis was conducted on all interview 
transcripts.  
 
The key findings of this research were first that general consideration of trade and investment 
was not a top priority in the regulatory development process which was predominantly focussed 
on such things as complying with international standards and commitments, harmonizing 
regulations with the US and internationally, responding to health, safety and environmental 
needs and responding more recently to domestic streamlining and modernization initiatives.   
 
Second, where regulators did take issues of trade and investment into consideration was in the 
context of regulatory harmonization with trade partners, ensuring international transparency 
and disclosure through Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
commitments and avoiding barriers to trade to maintain Canada’s overall competitiveness.  The 
whole issue of regulating to avoid international trade disputes did come up however it was not 
a leading consideration. 
 
Third, when regulators spoke about international trade and investment, there was no 
differentiation between the different types of trade fora or agreements or their implications.  
NAFTA was seen as the most relevant agreement by regulators followed by the WTO.  Most 
interestingly, all levels of regulator indicated that FIPAs (or Canadian BITs) were not relevant.  
Most references to trade commitments on the part of regulators referred to SPS or TBT 
commitments under the WTO or NAFTA and these were felt to have the greatest impact.  
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NAFTA Chapter 11 on investment did not rank as an influencing factor.  In fact there was very 
little to no knowledge of NAFTA Chapter 11 across all the regulatory departments.   
 
Fourth, where there had been a NAFTA dispute that had impacted one of their department’s 
regulatory measures, the level of knowledge was still quite vague and the understanding of the 
implications or costs associated with such a challenge was not high.  A regulator’s experience 
with ISDS challenges may have made them more aware and more likely to flag future regulatory 
changes for legal advice, but this did not impact their decision making.  These disputes were 
seen as one off incidents which did not have a bearing on future regulation.   
 
Finally, a majority of HSE regulators claimed that there has been a steady and increasing level 
of stringency and comprehensiveness in regulations in Canada in the area of HSE over the last 
decade and not a declining trend which one might expect as one signal that IIAs were having a 
chilling impact.  This trend was supported by a statistical analysis of HSE regulations during 
this period. 
 
Analysis and Implications 
 
Are Regulators aware of IIAs and do they factor them into the regulatory development 
process? 
 
This case study revealed that HSE regulators did not have a high level of awareness of IIAs in 
general and they generally did not take them into consideration when developing regulation 
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even when they had previously faced or were aware of an ISDS challenge to a regulatory 
measure. 
 
Key considerations in the regulatory development process 
Of primary interest in this analysis was understanding the specific role that international trade 
and investment commitments play in the regulatory development process and gauging the level 
of awareness of regulators with respect to these commitments and particularly NAFTA Chapter 
11. 
 
Regulators were asked to outline and discuss how specifically they considered international 
trade in the regulatory development process.  This was obviously key to the research question 
regarding the impact of trade and investment agreements on HSE regulation.  By probing the 
ways in which regulators consider Canada’s international trade and investment commitments 
in the regulatory development process, the goal was to understand the level of impact in general 
and how litigation under bilateral investment agreements or NAFTA was specifically of 
relevance.  The goal was also to determine the level of awareness that existed among regulators 
about the potential impact of these international investment agreements such as NAFTA 
Chapter 11 and whether they made a distinction when discussing ‘trade’ between the goal of 
ensuring trade facilitation and ensuring market access, versus the avoidance of disputes or even 
between the different types of trade and investment commitments to which Canada is signatory.   
 
While Canada’s trade and investment commitments ranked low vis-à-vis all other factors 
influencing the regulatory development process, Table 2 shows that when regulators were asked 
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the extent to which they consider Canada’s trade and investment commitments as relevant to 
the regulatory process in more absolute terms, 31% said ‘very much’, 48% said ‘some’ while 
20% said either ‘not very much’ or ‘not at all’.  This varied marginally by level of seniority 
with the most senior regulators at the Director General level evenly split between these three 
responses and the remaining regulators from Director, Section Head, Manager or the more 
technical non managerial grades, all most likely to give ‘some’ consideration to trade and 
investment commitments.18  This is perhaps not surprising as one might expect these types of 
issues to be more top of mind the more senior the regulator.   
 
Table 2 – Regulators’ views on the relevance of trade and investment commitments 
___________________________________ 
Table 2 about here 
___________________________________ 
 
Table 3 – Factors influencing the regulatory development process 
___________________________________ 
Table 3 about here 
___________________________________ 
 
Rather as table 3 shows, the main influencing factors for regulators included responding to 
health, safety and environmental needs whereby regulatory development was driven by existing 
gaps in protection, assessed levels of risk or responding to an existing need.  This driver was 




‘First and foremost is the determination of the health issue’19  
 
Many regulators also identified the need to respond to advances in science, technology and 
innovation when developing regulations or amending existing regulations, responding to 
stakeholder expectations, responding to domestic streamlining and modernization initiatives 
which have been the cornerstone of the Federal Government’s agenda20 and complying and 
harmonizing with international standards and commitments.  As one regulator put it 
 
‘The bedrock is US regulation’.21   
 
Finally, facilitating international trade was identified as an influencing factor in the regulatory 
development process.  The focus here was very much on maintaining competitiveness and 
continuing to ensure market access through regulations which did not impose undue burdens 
on industry or to the free flow of goods and services with Canada’s trading partners.     
 
Specific ways in which regulators consider trade and investment 
Regulators where asked in the electronic survey to identify under what situations Canada’s trade 
and investments commitments were of most concern and were asked to identify all those which 





Table 4 – Regulators’ views on the role played by trade and investment commitments 
___________________________________ 
Table 4 about here 
___________________________________ 
 
Table 4 shows that between 40%-50% felt that trade and investment commitments were of 
concern a) as part of the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAs) which necessitates 
consideration of trade and investment implications of any new regulation, b) In balancing the 
economic cost-benefits of a regulatory decision, in order to avoid a barrier to trade or to the free 
commercial flow of goods and investment, and c) in identifying regulatory alternatives for 
addressing a public need.  Only 36% felt that these agreements were of concern when a trade 
agreement is being negotiated or to ensure that any new regulation would not lead to a trade 
dispute or litigation from international investors, while 20% thought they were rarely of 
concern. 
 
Avoiding international trade and investment disputes 
The extent to which regulators seek to avoid international trade or investment disputes when 
developing regulations was of great interest to this research.  This was not a widespread theme 
amongst the senior regulators that were interviewed.  As noted previously however, 36% of 
survey respondents selected it as a factor that they consider, and there was some awareness 
regarding the possibility that new regulations or changes to regulations could result in a trade 





Looking at the survey data collected on this issue, when a cross tabulation was performed, the 
importance placed on this did differ by department with the most concern to avoid disputes 
being shown among regulators at the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (57%), Transport 
Canada (75%) and Natural Resources Canada (75%).  The number of respondents from these 
departments was small however and when we look at the larger responses from Environment 
Canada and Health Canada the number of regulators who see this as a concern is much lower 
at 45.5% and 30% respectively.  None of the regulators from the Canadian Nuclear Safety 
Commission saw this as a concern. 22 
 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of seniority levels of regulators 
on the likelihood that they would consider ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ in 
the regulatory development process.  The model contained five levels of seniority as 
independent variables (Director General, Director, Head of Section, Manager, Other).  23  The 
strongest predictor of a regulator’s likelihood to consider trade and investment dispute 
avoidance as a factor was the level of Director General, recording an odds ratio of 3.056.  This 
indicated that regulators at the Director General level were 3 times more likely to identify this 
as a factor of concern, controlling for all other factors in the model.  Directors were 1.5 times 
more likely and Head of Sections were 1.6 times more likely to see this as an influencing factor.  
Managers were .98 times less likely to see this as an important factor showing a negative B 
value24 of -.018.  (Table 5) This suggests that the more senior a regulator the greater their 




Table 5 – Logistic regression predicting impact of seniority on the likelihood of a regulator 
considering trade and investment dispute avoidance as a factor 
___________________________________ 
Table 5 about here 
___________________________________ 
 
Among the few that mentioned this as an issue in the face-to-face interviews, they saw it as a 
peripheral influence and something about which they would seek legal advice, but not a factor 
that would shape the HSE regulation.  Generally the type of ‘trade dispute’ was quite vague and 
did not denote any particular knowledge of trade versus investment disputes, state-to-state 
versus investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms,  nor differentiate between the possible 
regional, bilateral or multilateral fora.  A few regulators suggested the need to manage the 
expectation or perception of foreign investors in order to avoid such a challenge.  These 
regulators were among the few that had had specific experiences with NAFTA Chapter 11.  
Even in these cases it was made clear that the social mandate was the primary driver in 
regulatory development and that the desire to avoid a trade dispute simply led to a heightened 
awareness of the issue and did not alter the outcome.  One senior environmental regulator with 
experience of NAFTA Chapter 11 suggested    
 
‘I don’t want to step into a major trade issue.  At the same time, it is not our primary 




 A sub theme was the role played by political interests in the process of regulatory development 
or in the implementation of regulations such as environmental assessments.  As one senior 
environmental regulator put it 
 
 ‘trade difficulty arises when there is political interest in a project’.25 
 
In efforts to probe awareness of Canada’s international trade commitments and specifically the 
extent to which they impact regulatory decision making, it became clear that trade and 
investment are not drivers at all for many health, safety and environmental regulators (20% of 
those surveyed stated that they are not of concern).  There was a lack of understanding of 
Canada’s trade and investment obligations and no real awareness or widespread concern about 
the possible impact of investment disputes.  Regulators were putting health and safety first, saw 
science as a key driver and as such were concerned with ensuring a risk based, objective, solid 
science basis to justify adding a regulation in the area of health, safety and the environment.   
They were consistently clear on this issue. 
 
‘Trade commitments are ‘not front of mind’  
‘Trade is ‘not a priority’  
‘Trade doesn’t change what we measure.  The results are the results’  





The most relevant trade and investment commitments to regulatory development  
As outlined above, international trade and investment is from time to time a consideration in 
the regulatory development process in a number of ways, including some desire to avoid 
international trade disputes.  It was important however to determine to what extent regulators 
differentiated between international trade and investment agreements such as NAFTA and other 
international trade commitments at the bilateral and multilateral level.  Additionally it was 
important that they differentiate between the types of trade commitments that were most 
relevant, such as investment (which could expose their government to ISDS challenges to HSE 
regulation) versus commitments on SPS or TBT. 
 
Regulators were asked in the electronic survey which agreements they considered most relevant 
to the regulatory development process.  The largest percentage indicated the relevance of 
NAFTA at 74% followed by the WTO at 49% and other bilateral agreements at 32%.  Only 7% 
of respondents indicated investment agreements or Foreign Investment Protection Agreements 
(FIPAs)27 as being of relevance as outlined in Table 6 below.  When level of seniority was 
factored into the analysis, there was consistent and unanimous support among regulators 
regarding the relevance of NAFTA to regulatory decision making.  At every level of 
management, over 70% of regulators overwhelmingly indicated this was the case.  Director 
Generals were more inclined than other regulators to identify the WTO as relevant.  Most 
interestingly, all levels of regulator indicated that FIPAs were not relevant, with 84% of 
Director Generals, 95.5% Directors, 92% Sector Heads, 94% Managers and 100% of technical 
regulators indicating they did not find them relevant.28  This is not surprising as the profile of 
the FIPA in Canada has been quite low (until the recent completion of negotiations towards the 
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Canada-China FIPA which substantially raised the profile), and no ISDS challenges have been 
launched against the government’s regulatory measures under FIPAs to date. 
 
Table 6 – Regulators’ views on type of trade and investment agreement most relevant 
___________________________________ 
Table 6 about here 
___________________________________ 
 
Additionally, direct logistic regression was performed to assess whether regulators were more 
likely to consider ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ in the regulatory 
development process with respect to different trade treaties.  The model contained four trade 
treaties as independent variables (WTO, NAFTA, FTA, FIPA).29  Two of the independent 
variables showed a unique statistically significant contribution to the model (WTO, FTAs).  The 
strongest predictor of a regulator’s likelihood to consider trade and investment dispute 
avoidance as a factor was with respect to the WTO, recording an odds ratio30 of 5,526.  This 
indicated that regulators were 5 times more likely to consider ‘the avoidance of trade and 
investment disputes’ with respect to the WTO, controlling for all other factors in the model.  
They were 4 times as likely under FTAs (OR=4.226) and 2.5 times as likely under NAFTA 
(OR=2.528).  Finally they were 0.819 times less likely to consider this issue under FIPAs where 
the B value was -.204 and the odds ratio was .816.  This result suggests that when developing 
regulations, regulators are most concerned about disputes that might arise under the WTO 




Table 7 – Logistic regression predicting impact of different trade treaties on the likelihood 
a regulator would consider the avoidance of trade and investment disputes in the 
regulatory development process 
___________________________________ 
Table 7 about here 
___________________________________ 
 
Again this finding is interesting for several reasons.  First, the likelihood of a trade and 
investment dispute arising under Canada’s WTO commitments is quite low and yet it plays a 
bigger role in the minds of regulators.  Furthermore such a dispute would involve a state to state 
action rather than an investor state challenge.  Similarly, the likelihood of regulators taking the 
‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes into account with respect to FTAs as separate 
from NAFTA is also surprising given the absence of any history of disputes under Canada’s 
FTAs (apart from NAFTA).  This lends some credibility to the assumption that regulators do 
not fully understand the concept of a ‘dispute’ in this regard and are most likely considering 
their involvement within these fora on committees dealing with TBT and SPS issues.  This is 
probed below. 
 
In order to understand whether regulator’s consideration of disputes under these agreements 
were with respect to investment commitments or other areas they were questioned about the 
types of commitments (namely investment, SPS, TBT) they felt had an impact on the regulatory 
development process under both NAFTA and the WTO with a view to understanding the 




It was the agreements on SPS and TBT measures that regulators felt had the greatest impact 
under both NAFTA and the WTO.  The majority of regulators felt that NAFTA Chapter 11 on 
investment and the investment provisions of the WTO (TRIMS) had no, or very limited impact 
on the regulatory development process.  A cross tabulation was undertaken to determine 
whether level of seniority had an influence on regulator views about the impact of NAFTA 
Chapter 11.  All levels of regulator felt strongest that NAFTA Chapter 11 did not have a big 
impact with Head of Section regulators showing the largest inclination at 100%. 31   This is a 
particularly important finding.  While it is not surprising that these regulators will feel the 
influence of the government’s commitments on SPS and TBT as these agreements go to the 
heart of their work and requirements for notification.  At the same time the fact that they feel 
very little impact in their regulatory decision making from NAFTA Chapter 11 on investment 
is directly relevant to our understanding of any possible chilling effect from IIAs. 
 
The in-depth interviews reinforced this message.  There was little differentiation among 
regulators between types of trade and investment commitments.  More emphasis was placed on 
WTO and across all agreements on SPS and TBT measures.  These were seen as most relevant 
given their notification requirements.  Additionally, many regulators are involved in the SPS 
and TBT committees set up under NAFTA and the WTO.  There was very little awareness of 
the existence of investment agreements, either NAFTA Chapter 11, bilateral investment treaties 
(or FIPAs as they are known in Canada) or within the WTO (TRIMS).  Similarly there was 
little awareness of the existence of investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions or the 
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types of disputes which might arise under such provisions.  Where there was experience within 
a department of a NAFTA Chapter 11 challenge there was slightly more awareness.   
 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess whether the views of regulators about the 
impact of NAFTA Chapter 11 on decision making was correlated with the likelihood that these 
same regulators would consider ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ in the 
regulatory development process.  The model contained three impacts of NAFTA Chapter 11 on 
decision making as independent variables (NAFTA Chapter 11 had a ‘big impact’, ‘small 
impact’ or ‘no impact’).  Only one of the independent variables made a unique statistically 
significant contribution to the model (NAFTA Chapter 11 has no impact on decision making). 
32  Not surprisingly regulators were less likely (OR = 0.148) to consider ‘the avoidance of trade 
and investment disputes’ in the regulatory development process where they believed NAFTA 
Chapter 11 had no impact, controlling for all other factors in the model.  Regulators were 1.2 
times more likely to consider this issue when they felt NAFTA Chapter 11 had a small impact.  
This is outlined in Table 8 below. 
 
Table 8 – Logistic regression predicting the impact of regulators’ views about the impact 
of NAFTA Chapter 11 on decision making with the likelihood that these same regulators 
would consider ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ in the regulatory 
development process 
___________________________________ 





Experience with trade disputes and concern over investment commitments 
Another key component of assessing awareness of Canada’s investment commitments and their 
impact was to gauge the extent to which regulators had knowledge of the investor state dispute 
provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 and the possible policy and cost implications of a challenge.   
 
Regulators were asked whether they were aware of any NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes or threats 
of a dispute launched against their area of regulatory policy.  Very few regulators were aware 
of any such threats with only 12% claiming awareness.  This was very much in line with the in-
depth discussions held with senior regulators where there was very little awareness or concern 
about NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes.     
 
Considering responses by government department, there was zero awareness of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 disputes amongst regulators from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
(CNSC), the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans (DFO), Transport Canada (TC) and the National Energy Board (NEB) that responded 
to the survey.  Additionally, of more significance 96% of Health Canada (HC) and 97% of 
Environment Canada (EC) regulators were not aware of NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges despite 
the fact that a number of past and current challenges would have impacted these departments.33  
Finally, less surprising was the fact that 40% of the Pest Management Review Agency (PMRA) 
and 77% of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) regulators had 
awareness of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes reflecting a number of high profile past and present 
cases34 in their organizations.35  Understanding whether this awareness led regulators to take 
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these disputes into consideration when developing regulations, was the next stage in the process 
of trying to determine whether the regulatory chill hypothesis was potentially viable. 
 
Among those regulators that were aware of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes, 42% claimed that 
despite this awareness it did not influence the regulatory development process at all, while 17% 
claimed it influenced the process ‘very much’ and 25% ‘some’.  In an effort to look at this issue 
in more depth and to understand the extent to which awareness of disputes had an impact on 
regulatory decision making, a number of additional cross tabulations were undertaken with the 
survey data.   
 
First we looked at whether a regulator’s level of awareness of a NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute or 
threat affected the extent to which it influenced their regulatory development process.  Do they 
consider this influence more than regulators with no awareness?  The results of the cross 
tabulation suggest that those regulators who were aware of disputes in their areas felt it impacted 
their decision making only somewhat 28.6% or not very much 28%.  Only 21.4% said it 
impacted their decision on regulatory development process very much.36  Similarly, the analysis 
looked at the extent to which a regulator’s awareness of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes or threats, 
was correlated with their identification of ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ as 
influencing their regulatory decision making.  The results of this analysis suggest that close to 
two thirds of regulators who were aware of disputes in their area did not also consider ‘the 
avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ as influencing their regulatory decision making.37  
This finding is interesting as it suggests that even when a regulator has awareness of disputes, 




Perceptions regarding trends in regulation over the last decade 
We have established that in the Canadian context, regulator awareness of IIAs was low and 
regulators did not in general take IIAs or a threat of an ISDS dispute into consideration when 
developing HSE regulations.  The interviews and survey of regulators also sought to probe 
regulator perceptions about trends in regulation in Canada during the period of NAFTA Chapter 
11 disputes, in order to understand whether there was a perceived decrease or increase in 
regulatory stringency and comprehensiveness.  Tables 9 and 10 outline these results. 
 
As Table 9 indicates, 67%, the majority of the 135 survey respondents believe that regulations 
have become more comprehensive in terms of the number of areas being regulated over the last 
decade while 16% felt they had remained constant.   
 
Table 9 – Regulators’ views on trends in the comprehensiveness of HSE Regulations over 
last decade  
___________________________________ 
Table 9 about here 
___________________________________ 
Table 10 – Regulators’ views on trends in the stringency of HSE Regulations over last 
decade 
___________________________________ 





Similarly 59% of respondents felt that regulations had become more stringent in terms of 
greater depth of science to demonstrate acceptability of risk, with 20% suggesting they had 
remained constant.  In both cases less than a fifth felt regulations had become either less 
comprehensive or less stringent.  Roughly one fifth of regulators also argued that governments 
were regulating differently. 
 
Consistent with these results, in the interviews regulators argued that regulations in HSE have 
generally been increasing in stringency and comprehensiveness driven by new areas now being 
regulated, deeper science requirements, a strong international influence, increasing public 
scrutiny and demands, and the push for harmonization of regulations with the US.  Interestingly, 
the push for harmonization of regulations with the US and internationally has involved an 
upward convergence in regulatory levels.  Alongside this trend, a desire for regulatory 
efficiency and modernization has also resulted in a different way of regulating.   
 
An analysis of Canadian HSE regulations was undertaken using the Canada Gazette publication 
of proposed and adopted regulations between 1889-2013 in order to determine whether there 
had been a trend of regulatory decrease, increase or neutral change.  As outlined in Table 11, 
this analysis showed that across the 1579 newly adopted regulations, while there was a 
downward trend in the growth rate of new HSE regulations during this period, there had been 





Figure 1 – Composition of adopted HSE regulations – Canada Gazette 2 
___________________________________ 





This research was aimed at providing a more comprehensive and systematic approach to the 
consideration of regulatory chill, beyond the case-by-case approach which has characterized 
analysis of this issue to date.  Both the findings of this research and the methodology used are 
aimed at addressing the gap in research by considering the views and understanding of 
regulators themselves.  Overall this research found no consistent observable evidence of 
regulator awareness and understanding of IIAs and their potential impact.  While this does not 
categorically rule out the possibility of regulatory chill as has been demonstrated by numerous 
anecdotal examples, it suggests that there is no evidence of a consistent trend in this regard, 
despite decades of repeated ISDS challenges to HSE regulations through NAFTA Chapter 11. 
 
This work has shown that in the ideal test case of Canada under NAFTA Chapter 11, there does 
not appear to be a specific impact of IIA ISDS on HSE regulatory decision making and to the 
extent that this is generalizable, that the impact of private actors in the policy making process 
is perhaps less pronounced than many fear.  This is an evolving area and as litigation continues 
and opposition to the ISDS provisions of IIAs becomes more vocal, the awareness and impact 




At the same time, this research revealed that there is a broader relationship between 
international trade and investment and the constraints or pressure a government might feel in 
its ability to regulate in the public interest.  Regulators are interested in the views of their peers 
as expressed within multilateral and regional fora like the WTO and NAFTA, in committees on 
SPS and TBT and this explains the relevance they placed on this fora.  Future research will need 
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Table 1 – Completed HSE ISDS challenges under NAFTA Chapter 11 
















Regulation of gasoline 
additives: Ban on import and 
inter-provincial trade of 
unleaded gasoline additive 
methylcyclopentadienyl 
manganee tricarbonyl (MMT).  










repealed the ban 







PCB waste export and import 
regulations: Temporary ban 
on export of toxic PCB waste 














Regulation of pesticides:  Ban 
on sale and use of crop 
pesticide and fungicide 
Lindane 


















Waste disposal regulations: 
Provincial government blocks 
proposed landfill on site of 
decommissioned open-pit 
mine 
















Regulation of pesticides: 
Quebec provincial ban on sale 
and certain uses of lawn 
pesticides containing 2.4-D 





















Natural resource regulation: 
Quebec Provincial measures to 
return water use and timber 
rights to crown and 
expropriate lands associated 
with hydro rights 















Provincial land use regulation: 
measure taken by Ontario 
Government affecting proposal 
to convert agricultural lands 
into aggregate quarry. ($275 



























Oil and Gas Performance 
Requirements:  Canada-
Newfoundland offshore 
Petroleum Board placed 
requirements on Exon Mobil 
to Pay millions in R&D with 
respect to Hibernia & Terra 
Nova Oil fields ($40 million in 
damages sought) 




Award of $13.9 
million + 
interest to Mobil 




On-going NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes against Government of Canada 
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Dispute Department Measure Notice of 
Intent 
Status 








Environmental Assessment Regulations: 
Provincial and federal environmental reviews 
resulting in Basalt quarry and marine terminal 
rejected due to adverse environmental impacts. 
($188USD Million in compensation sought) 
Feb 2008 On-going 
Mesa Power 






Province of Ontario  
ENVIRONMENT 
Contract award criteria and approval process of 
the Food-in Tariff Program (FIT) under the 
Ontario Green Energy Act for wind farms to 
provide renewable electric power. ($775 million 
in compensation sought) 
July 2011 On-going 
Lone Pine 










Environmental management regulations: 
Provincial measure revoking oil and gas 
exploration permits following partial moratorium 
on hydraulic fracking in Quebec. ($250 million in 
compensation sought) 
Nov  2012 On-going 
Windstream 






Province of Ontario 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
Environmental management regulations: Off shore 
wind farm project put on hold following a 
Provincial moratorium on off shore wind farms. 
($475 million in compensation sought) 
Oct 2012 On-going 








Food & drug and intellectual property regulations: 
Invalidation of the Strattera and Zprexa pharma 
patents because drugs no longer met clinical trial 














Health regulation: The CEO of CEN Biotech was 
denied a licence under The Marijuana for 
Medicinal Purposes Regulations for security 
reasons ($4.8 billion USD in damages sought) 
Sept 2015 On-going 







Table 2 – Regulators’ views on the relevance of trade and investment commitments 
7.  To what extent do you consider Canada's trade and investment commitments as relevant to the 
regulatory process? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Very much   
 
39 31% 
2 Some   
 
61 48% 
3 not very much   
 
22 17% 
4 not at all   
 
4 3% 
 Total  126 100% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
 
Table 3 – Factors influencing the regulatory development process 
6.  When developing new regulations, changes to existing regulations, providing regulatory authorization 
or making decisions on evaluation and monitoring, there are a number of key drivers in your decision 
making process.  Please rank the influences below, where 1 indicates the most influential and 8 the least. 




The public environmental, health or 
safety need 
85 21 11 1 3 4 0 0 126 
2 
Science or technological advances in 
the field 
10 36 15 
17 
20 6 19 2 126 
3 
Canada's international trade and 
investment commitments 
6 11 12 24 15 20 31 6 126 
4 
The views of key industry stakeholders 
or proponents 
3 25 22 25 25 16 7 2 126 
5 
The views of other stakeholders such as 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) or the public 
1 9 22 12 27 28 20 6 126 
6 
Global trends such as the work of 
international bodies 
4 13 30 16 13 22 21 6 126 
7 
Domestic initiatives such as efforts at 
regulatory streamlining or red tape 
reduction 
19 18 17 27 12 17 13 2 126 
8 Other 10 5 4 2 3 5 2 93 126 
 Total 138 138 133 
12
4 
118 118 113 117 - 






Table 4 – Regulators’ views on the role played by trade and investment commitments 
8.  When are Canada's trade and investment commitments of most concern to you?  Which of the 
following describe how trade plays a role in your decision making?  You can identify as many as are  
# Answer   Response % 
1 When a trade agreement is being negotiated by 
Canada (to ensure any new commitments are 
compatible with existing regulations) 
  
 45 36% 
2 
In balancing the economic cost-benefits of a 
regulatory decision, in order to avoid a barrier to 





3 To ensure that any new regulation would not lead 
to a trade dispute or litigation from international 
investors 
  
 45 36% 
4 
As part of the Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Statement (RIAS) which necessitates consideration 





5 In identifying regulatory alternatives for addressing 
a public need 
  
 50 40% 
6 They are rarely of concern   
 
25 20% 
7 Other    10 8% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
 
Table 5 – Logistic regression predicting impact of seniority on the likelihood of  a 
regulator considering trade and investment dispute avoidance as a factor 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP (B) 
Lower Upper 
Director General 1.117 .743 2.260 1 .133 3.056 .712 13.107 
Director .417 .662 .397 1 .529 1.517 .415 5.550 
Head of Section .481 .707 .463 1 .496 1.618 .405 6.466 
Manager -.018 .783 .001 1 .982 .982 .212 4.553 
Constant -1.012 .583 3.002 1 .083 .364   
 
Table 6 – Regulators’ views on type of trade and investment agreement most relevant 
9.  Where trade is a factor, which types of trade commitments are relevant for you to consider when 
making a regulatory decision?  You can identify as many as are relevant. 






















Foreign Investment Protection 




5 Other   
 
21% 
Source:  Qualtrics Survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report May 22 2013 
50 
 
Table 7 – Logistic regression predicting impact of different trade treaties on the likelihood 
a regulator would consider the avoidance of trade and investment disputes in the 
regulatory development process 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP (B) 
Lower Upper 
WTO 1.709 .474 12.988 1 .000 5.526 2.181 13.999 
NAFTA .927 .603 2.366 1 .124 2.528 .776 8.241 
FTA 1.441 .487 8.746 1 .003 4.226 1.626 10.983 
FIPA -.204 1.010 .041 1 .840 .816 .113 5.910 




Table 8 – Logistic regression predicting the impact of regulators’ views about the impact 
of NAFTA Chapter 11 on decision making with the likelihood that these same regulators 
would consider ‘the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ in the regulatory 
development process 
 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp (B) 95% C.I. for EXP (B) 
Lower Upper 
Big Impact -1.658 .923 3.230 1 .072 .190 .031 1.162 
Small Impact .223 .632 .124 1 .724 1.250 .362 4.318 
No Impact -1.910 .601 10.098 1 .001 .148 .046 .481 
Constant .405 .456 .789 1 .374 1.500   
 
Table 9 – Regulators’ views on trends in the comprehensiveness of HSE Regulations over 
last decade 
3.  To the best of your knowledge, would you say that regulation within your area of expertise has 
become more or less comprehensive in its coverage over the last decade (where comprehensive refers 
to the number of emerging areas being regulated)? 
# Answer  
 
% 
1 More comprehensive   
 
67% 
2 Less comprehensive   
 
16% 
3 Other   
 
16% 
 Total  100% 




Table 10 – Regulators’ views on trends in the stringency of HSE Regulations over last 
decade 
4.  To the best of your knowledge, would you say that regulation in your area of expertise has become 
more or less stringent over the last decade (where stringent refers to the requirements for a greater 
depth of science to demonstrate acceptability of risk)? 
# Answer  
 
% 
1 More stringent   
 
59% 
2 Less stringent   
 
21% 
3 Other   
 
20% 
 Total  100% 
Source:  Qualtrics survey of Canadian Federal Regulators – Report 22 May 2013 
 
Figure 1 – Composition of adopted HSE regulations – Canada Gazette 2 
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10 Ibid. 
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by Hallward-Dreimier (2003) and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) all found little or no 
evidence that BITS had a positive impact on FDI.  The second wave of studies from 2004-2008 
seemed to solve issues of methodology such as poor data or small sample size.  Studies by 
Buthe and Milner (2004), Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), Salacuse and Sullivan (2005), 
Neumayer and Spess (2005), Gross and Trevino (2005), Gallagher and Birch (2006), Egger and 
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18 SPSS cross-tabulation indicates that 56.5% Directors, 48.1% Section Heads, 47.4% 




19Canadian Federal Regulator Interview transcripts – un-attributable quote due to 
confidentiality   
20 The Canadian Government has been very focussed on regulatory reform over the last ten 
years resulting from global trends and a desire to modernize the regulatory environment and 
increase links and ease of doing business with the US.  A number of key initiatives have 
characterized this focus, namely the 2003 Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulations, 
2011 Regulatory Cooperation Council with the US and the 2012 Red Tape Reduction Action 
Plan 
21 Canadian Federal Regulator Interview transcripts – un-attributable quote due to 
confidentiality   
22 SPSS crosstab analysis was undertaken which showed that the Chi Square test for 
independence indicated a significant association between government departments and the 
likelihood they consider the avoidance of trade and investment disputes as an important factor 
in regulatory development, x2(9, n=125)=19, p=0.024, phi=0.392. 
23The full model under the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 23showed goodness of fit with 
significance value of 1>.05.  The model as a whole explained between 3% (Cox and Snell R 
square) and 4% (Nagelkerke R squared)23 of the variability based on seniority level and 
correctly classified 64.8% of cases.  None of the independent variables showed a unique 
statistically significant contribution to the model suggesting that beyond the analysis of this 




24 Julie Pallant’s SPSS Survival Manual (4th edn.). McGraw Hill. 2010 explains that B values 
are ‘equivalent to the B values obtained in a multiple regression analysis’.  The positive or 
negative direction of the B value indicates the direction of the relationship where ‘negative B 
values indicate that an increase in the independent variable score will result in a decreased 
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25 Canadian Federal Regulator Interview transcripts – un-attributable quote due to 
confidentiality   
26 Canadian Federal Regulator Interview transcripts – un-attributable quote due to 
confidentiality   
27 FIPAs are Canada’s equivalent to the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) 
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the test showed x2(4, n=118)=5.99, p=.20, phi=.22, on NAFTA x2(4, n=119)=2.49, p=.64, 
phi=1.5, on FTA x2(4, n=119)=4.22, p=.37, phi=.19, on FIPA x2(4, n=119)=3.97, p=.41, 
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did not consider the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ as relevant to the regulatory 




square) and 34.3% (Nagelkerke R squared)29 of the variability based on type of agreement and 
correctly classified 74.1% of cases.   
30 Julie Pallant in SPSS Survival Manual quotes Tabachnick and Fidell’s 2007 book Using 
multivariate statistics (5th edn). Boston: Pearson Education, ‘the odds ratio represents the 
change in odds of being in one of the categories of outcome when the value of a predictor 
increases by one unit. P.177 
31 A cross tabulation in SPSS was undertaken to look at the relationship between level of 
seniority and views on the impact of NAFTA Chapter 11.  The Chi-Square test for 
independence indicated no significant association for ‘no impact’ x2(4, n=97)=2.42, p=.66, 
phi=.16, or ‘small impact’ it showed x2(4, n=98)=4.46, p=.35, phi=.21 
32 The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, X2 (3, N=96) = 20.098, 
p<.00132, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who did and 
did not consider the avoidance of trade and investment disputes’ as relevant to the regulatory 
development process. The model as a whole explained between 18.9% (Cox and Snell R 
square) and 25.7% (Nagelkerke R squared)32 of the variability based on the impact of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 and correctly classified 72.9% of cases.   
33 Table 1 outlines those NAFTA Chapter 11 challenges which have impacted regulatory 
measures in the departments of Health Canada and Environment Canada 
34 Both Chemtura v. Government of Canada and Dow AgroScience v. Government of Canada 




Clayton/Bilcon v. Government of Canada involves the rejection of a basalt quarry and marine 
terminal following a federal environmental review within the remit of CEAA. 
35 SPSS cross tabulation was undertaken to look at the relationship between government 
departments and awareness of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes.  A Chi-square test for 
independence indicated a significant association between government department and 
awareness of Chapter 11, x2(9, n=114)=52.41, p=.000, phi=.68 
36 Cross tabulation in SPSS did not show a significant relationship between awareness of 
Chapter 11 disputes on decision making in the regulatory development process.  A Chi-square 
test for independence indicated no significant association, x2(3, n=60)=3.69, p=.30, phi=.25  
37 Cross tabulation in SPSS did not show a significant relationship between awareness of 
Chapter 11 disputes and whether they also considered the avoidance of trade and investment 
disputes in the regulatory development process.  A Chi-square test for independence (with 
Yates Continuity Correction) indicated no significant association, , x2(1, n=113)=.07, p=.79, 
phi=.57 
38 The analysis of the Canada Gazette process involved a detailed review of thousands of 
published regulations in the Canada Gazette 2, between 1998 and 2013 with a view to 
identifying those with a particular focus on health, safety or the environment.  These numbered 
1579 in the case of actual adopted regulations or regulatory changes.  This analysis was aimed 
at understanding the quantity of proposed and adopted regulations by subject area (health, safety 
or environment) and across federal departments but more importantly whether these new 




and comprehensiveness.  A regulatory decrease for the purposes of this study refers to a 
decrease in the comprehensiveness or stringency of regulations or involves the elimination of 
regulations.  More concretely this would include regulatory changes which exempt a substance 
after a review or scientific advance, move control of an activity or substance from criminal law 
to regulation, change a substance from prescription to non-prescription status, increase the 
allowable level of a restricted or controlled substance or generally reduce the burden of 
regulatory requirements on industry.  Examples of this might include a move away from the 
criminalization of marihuana to allow for its medicinal use in certain circumstances or the 
elimination of a requirement for environmental assessments on all projects which are deemed 
‘unlikely to cause more than minor adverse environmental effects or pose more than minor 
environmental risks’  A regulatory increase for the purposes of this study refers to an increase 
in the comprehensiveness or stringency of regulations achieved by expanding the scope of 
regulatory coverage to include new substances or areas of activity or by increasing the depth 
and complexity of compliance requirements.  This might involve measures which increase the 
protection of the environment and human health or general increases in the burden of 
compliance for industry.  Examples of this would include new regulations dealing with hand 
held radiation devices or those aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions through greater 
emission control standards.  A neutral regulatory change for the purposes of this study refers 
to regulations where it is assumed the stringency and comprehensiveness of the regulation does 
not change, and might include non-substantive regulatory amendments, changes in fees or 
tariffs, clarifications to regulations or allowing for new uses of an existing registered substance.  
Examples of this would include changes to fishing or hunting season dates and catch allowances 




or general regulatory changes aimed at achieving greater efficiency.   The main purpose of this 
analysis is not to attribute value but rather to understand the trend as one possible indicator of 
regulatory chill.  Regulatory chill presupposes regulating less, reducing the stringency and 
comprehensiveness of regulations but also doing so out of fear for the consequences (whether 
it be the flight of FDI or the impact of litigation).  When all regulations were categorized by 
health, safety or environmental type it is clear that environmental regulations were most 
numerous at 661, followed by health at 554 and safety at 364.  There was a downward trend in 
growth rate of new regulations or regulatory changes from a high of 113 regulations in 1998 to 
63 in 2013, with the period between 1998 and 2005 averaging 112 regulations per year while 
the period between 2006-2-13 averaging only 85 regulations per year.  This trend towards the 
streamlining of regulations and modernization efforts aimed at reducing red tape and the 
regulatory burden on industry is likely a key driver.  Other factors may however have played a 
role such as a reduced imperative to introduce new regulations given the strong regulatory base 
Canada had already established through its regulatory development initiatives in the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s.  The Gazette 2 analysis showed that the trends in adopted regulatory changes 
under Gazette 2 have been towards neutral regulatory change (58%) or regulatory increases 
(36%).   
 
 
